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1. The nature of communication: ostension and inference 
 
Human communication takes place when one person does something that 
when seen or heard by another person is taken to be done with the intention 
to communicate, and the other person, having seen the communicator show 
his or her intention to communicate, then uses inference to determine what 
the communicator intends to communicate. This is possible because the 
addressee assumes that the communicator is a rational person, that is, acts 
with goals in mind (see Grice 1975), and so must be doing the act for a 
reason, and it is worth the addressee’s effort to try to determine what that 
reason is, that is, determine the relevance of the act.
1 We refer to what the 
communicator does as ostension (from Latin ostendere ‘to show’) or an 
ostensive act. The inference used by the addressee is abductive inference:
2 
having seen the ostensive act of the communicator, the addressee must infer 
why the communicator did that particular ostensive act in that particular 
context  to  that  particular  person,  and  by  doing  that,  infer  what  the 
communicator intended to communicate.  This sort of inference involves 
                                                 
1  The  cognitive  mechanisms  used  in  communication  and  the  desire  to  achieve 
relevance (“make sense of things”) are not particular to human communication. 
The desire to understand why someone has done something they have done is part 
of  a  general  desire  to  understand  the  actions  of  other  humans  (we  are  social 
primates, and it is important to our survival that we understand the actions of those 
around us), which itself is part of a larger desire to understand and make sense of 
the world around us, again, a survival instinct (which also explains religion) (cf. 
Levinson 1995). 
2 Abduction: one observes some surprising situation, A; if B were true, A would 
not be surprising (it would make sense); therefore it is likely that B is true. This is 
the  basis  for  much  or  our  hypothesis  creation  and  the  way  we  understand  the 
actions of others. See Peirce (1940, Ch. 11), Givón (1989, Ch. 7), Levinson (1995). Randy J. LaPolla  2 
assembling  a  set  of  assumptions  in  which  the  doing  of  that  particular 
ostensive  act  would  “make  sense”  in  that  particular  context  and  to  that 
particular  person;  that  is,  the  addressee  must  create  a  context  of 
interpretation in which the relevance of the ostensive act will be clear to the 
addressee. In fact inference is involved in the entire interpretation process: 
the  recognition  of  the  ostensive  act  as  a  communicative  act  requires 
inference; recognition of the form of the ostensive act as, for example, a 
particular phrase or set of words in a particular language requires inference; 
“fleshing  out”  the  so-called  “sentence  meaning”  requires  inference;  and 
determining the communicative intention of the communicator (“speaker 
meaning”)  requires  inference.  There  is  no  coding-decoding  process 
involved in communication; what is necessary for communication is not the 
exchange of symbolic expressions, but the successful determination of the 
reason for the communicator making the particular ostensive act that he or 
she  made  (see  LaPolla  2003  for  more  discussion;  see  also  Sperber  and 
Wilson 1996 on the concept of relevance). The meaning is not in the words; 
it is created in the mind of the addressee (cf. Reddy 1979).
3 
The particular form that the communicator chooses for the ostensive act 
is also based on inference of what he or she infers will be the optimal form 
for the ostensive act given the particular situation and what assumptions the 
communicator  assumes  are  manifest  (known  or  accessible)  to  the 
addressee. The communicator attempts to choose a form for the ostensive 
act that minimizes his or her own effort, but at the same time allows the 
addressee to infer what the communicator wants the addressee to infer. This 
is  where  language  comes  in.  Language  is  a  tool  for  constraining  the 
assembly  of  the  set  of  assumptions  that  makes  up  the  context  of 
interpretation. Let us look at an example (adapted from LaPolla 2003:116): 
 
(1)  Q: Do you want something to drink? 
A1: (points with finger) 
A2: I have soup. 
A3: No. I have soup. 
A4: No, because I have soup. 
A5: No, since I have soup, I don’t need anything to drink. 
A6: No, I don’t want anything to drink. Since I have soup, I don’t 
need anything else to drink right now. 
                                                 
3 Another way to say this is that what is important is not what the speaker says, but 
what  the  addressee  understands.  This  is  why,  for  example  with  irony,  what  is 
understood can be the opposite of what is said. The How and Why of Syntactic Relations 
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This  example  occurred  when  a  husband  and  wife  were  sitting  down  to 
dinner.  The  husband  asked  the  wife  if  she  wanted  something  to  drink. 
Given the situation, she could have used any of the answers given in (1). 
The  answer  in  (A1)  would  require  the  husband  to  assume  that  she  is 
answering his question and infer that by moving her hand in that way she is 
pointing at something, and that the pointing is the ostensive act she has 
chosen to answer his question, and he has to guess what it is that she is 
pointing at, and inferring it is the bowl in front of her finger, he has to 
notice that the bowl has soup in it, and infer that the soup in the bowl is 
somehow relevant to his answer, and then notice that the soup is thin and 
infer that it is a kind of drinkable liquid, and infer that she intends him to 
infer all of this and then infer that since she has a bowl of drinkable liquid, 
she doesn’t need anything else to drink. That is, he would have to assemble 
all of these assumptions and inferences together to form a context in which 
her pointing would achieve relevance. She could have also chosen to say 
(A2), and then at least the first few steps in the inferential process would 
have  been  made  easier  for  the  husband  by  constraining  his  search  for 
assumptions to create the context of interpretation in which the ostensive 
act would achieve relevance. If she chose to say (A3), another part of the 
process would have been made easier, as he could assume negation was 
somehow involved, though he would have to infer the relationship between 
the sense of negation and the rest of her statement. If she chose (A4), the 
subordinate conjunction because would make the inference of the semantic 
relationship between the sense of negation and the rest of the statement 
more determinate. The answer in (A5) would again reduce the difficulty of 
the inferential process, as the conclusion would be made more explicit, and 
(A6) goes a step further in terms of explicitness. All of these answers were 
possible, but the wife actually chose (A1). Even though this was the most 
difficult for her husband, it was the easiest for her, and she inferred that he 
was capable of creating a context of interpretation (putting together all of 
the assumptions mentioned above) in which her action would make sense 
as an answer to his question.  
Communication does not require language, but language makes the job 
of both the communicator and the addressee easier,  much like  a shovel 
makes it easier to dig a hole as compared to using one’s hands to dig the 
hole.  Language  is  in  fact  a  tool  like  any  other  in  our  society,  a 
conventionalized method of achieving some goal more easily, but unlike 
many  other  tools  that  people  purposefully  create,  and  more  like  a  path 
through a field, which is not created purposefully, most of language is not Randy J. LaPolla  4 
created with the purpose of creating language, but develops as a result of 
communicators trying to constrain the addressee’s process of inference. It 
is then a phenomenon of the third kind (an “invisible hand” phenomenon): 
man-made,  but  not  intentionally  created,  a  by-product  of  the  effort  to 
achieve some other goal, like the creation of an economy or a traffic jam or 
a path through a field (see Keller 1994). Language structure develops as 
particular ways of constraining the context of interpretation are repeated 
over and over again, until they become habits at the individual level and 
conventions at the societal level. That is, one person innovates in some 
way,  and  if  it  somehow  helps  the  addressee  infer  the  communicator’s 
intention, the communicator will continue to use that form, and then others, 
noticing  it  is  effective,  will  also  begin  to  use  it,  until  it  becomes 
conventionalized,  and  part  of  the  language.  Conventionalization  is  of 
course a gradual process, and so any particular feature can be more or less 
conventionalized. What we think of as the “rules” of language, which when 
violated produce “ungrammatical” utterances, are simply those structures 
that  have  become  fully  conventionalized  (see  Hopper  1987,  1988  on 
grammar  as  emergent  from  discourse),  and  on  the  individual  level  are 
ingrained  habits  of behaviour.  Such  structures  become  obligatory  in  the 
language, and so become obligatory constraints on interpretation. 
Notice  that  the  greater  explicitness  and  the  consequent  reduction  in 
inferential difficulty as we moved from (A1) to (A6) in the example above 
was  due  to  greater  use  of  both  grammatical  and  lexical  material. 
Grammatical  and  lexical  material  differ  in  terms  of  being  manipulated 
holistically or analytically (see Lehmann 2002), but both types of material 
constrain the creation of the context of interpretation; there is no distinction 
between “conceptual” (lexical) and “procedural” (grammatical) information 
in this regard (contra Wilson and Sperber 1993), and no difference between 
contextualization  cues  (Gumperz  1992)  and  the  rest  of  language  in  this 
regard—all of language is a contextualization cue.  
As language structure develops because of the effort to constrain the 
addressee’s  search  for  relevance  (i.e.  to  constrain  the  assembling  of 
assumptions  to  go  into  the  context  of  interpretation),  what  particular 
structures develop in each language will be a matter of what semantic or 
functional  domains  the  speakers  of  the  language  feel  it  is  important  to 
constrain the interpretation of. As each community of speakers is unique, 
so  each  language  will  be  unique  in  terms  of  what  becomes 
conventionalized to the point of obligatorily constraining the construction 
and interpretation of utterances. The differences between languages then 
can  be  seen  in  terms  of  what  semantic  or  functional  domains  are The How and Why of Syntactic Relations 
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obligatorily constrained (e.g. role identification, or the time of the action 
relative to the time of speaking), the degree to which they are constrained 
(e.g. how many tense distinctions are made if the interpretation of the time 
of the action relative to the time of speaking is to be constrained), and the 
particular  lexicogrammatical  form  that  is  used  to  constrain  the 
interpretation (e.g. possessive modifier on a noun vs. affix on a verb to 
mark possession) (see LaPolla 2003 for examples and discussion). 
 
 
2. The nature of syntactic relations 
 
The  sort  of  conventionalization  discussed  above  includes  all  aspects  of 
language;  lexical  and  grammatical  material  are  both  the  result  of 
conventionalization from repeated use. What we are interested in here are 
syntactic relations, which are conventionalized patterns for constraining the 
identification  of  referents  and  the  roles  they  play  in  events  or  states  of 
affairs  (see  LaPolla,  to  appear).
4  They  may  be  conventionalized 
associations of position of a referring expression in the clause with some 
semantic  role,  such  as  in  English,  where  a  preverbal  reference  to  some 
referent  in  a  clause  with  an  active  transitive  verb  will  constrain  the 
interpretation to one in which that referent is seen as the actor of the action 
denoted by the verb, and a postverbal reference to some referent in the 
same clause will constrain the interpretatio to one in which that referent is 
seen as the undergoer of the action (e.g. given the expression Bob hit Bill, 
the  conventions  of  English  usage  constrain  the  interpretation  to  one  in 
which Bob is seen as the one doing the hitting and Bill is the one being hit).  
  They  may be  conventionalized associations of  marking on nouns or 
pronouns  with  particular  semantic  roles,  such  as  in  Old  English,  where 
nominative  case  marking  of  a  pronoun  in  an  active  transitive  clause 
constrains the interpretation to one in which the referent of the pronoun is 
seen as the actor of the action denoted by the verb, and accusative case 
marking  of  a  pronoun  constrains  the  interpretation  to  one  in  which  the 
referent of the pronoun is seen as the undergoer of the action. Pronouns 
                                                 
4 Note that the identification of the role of the referent in an event or state of affairs 
is  crucial  to  the  concept  of  syntactic  relations.  There  are  other  types  of 
conventionalized constraints on referent identification in some languages, such as 
the  sortal  classifiers  of  Thai  and  Chinese,  but  as  these  do  not  constrain  the 
interpretation of the role of the referent, they are not considered syntactic relations 
of the type relevant to this volume. Randy J. LaPolla  6 
may also become affixed to the verb and so form an agreement or cross-
reference system (see discussion below).  
  Syntactic  relations  may  also  be  conventionalized  assumptions  that 
referring expressions in two clauses both refer to the same referent, such as 
in English, where there is a conventionalized assumption of coreference in 
conjoined clauses such that a referring expression representing a particular 
role  in  one  of  the  clauses  and  a  particular  role  represented  by  a  zero 
pronoun in the other clause must be understood as coreferential (e.g. in Jim 
picked  up  the  newspaper  and  threw  it,  the  forced  assumption  that  the 
referent  of  Jim  is  the  same  referent  as  the  omitted  actor  of  the  second 
clause, the one that threw the newspaper).
5 Many other possible ways of 
constraining this particular functional domain exist as well. 
Each of these conventionalized forms has the function of limiting the 
possible interpretation(s) of the role of a referent  referred to (overtly or 
covertly) in an utterance. Although traditionally these structures have been 
seen as part of one grammatical category, e.g. “subject”, they are not “one 
thing”, but instead are individual ways of constraining the interpretation of 
who is doing what to whom, and languages differ in terms of whether or 
not they constrain this functional domain at all, and if they do constrain this 
functional  domain,  they  differ  in  terms  of  which  particular  structures 
constrain the interpretation and which particular roles are identified, and in 
terms of the particular mechanisms used to constrain the interpretation. I 
have  given  examples  of  these  differences  and  arguments  why  syntactic 
relations do not form a single category in any one language,  and so of 
course  are  not  part  of  any  cross-linguistic  category,  in  another  paper 
(LaPolla, to appear; see also LaPolla and Poa, to appear; Van Valin 1977, 
1981; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997, Ch. 6; Dryer 1997), so I will not repeat 
them here. What I would like to do here is focus on the how and the why of 
syntactic relations. 
 
 
                                                 
5  Note  that  the  identification  of  the  referent  of  it  as  the  same  as  that  of  the 
newspaper is not due to syntactic relations, but simply to pure inference; there is 
nothing in the grammar that obligatorily constrains the interpretation, the way the 
inference  of  the  relationship  between  Jim  and  the  thrower  of  the  newspaper  is 
constrained by the grammar. The How and Why of Syntactic Relations 
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3. How syntactic relations develop 
 
Many syntactic theories assume all languages exhibit syntactic relations, 
and some even assume all languages exhibit the same syntactic relations, 
particularly  the  supposed  category  of  “subject”  (taking  English  as  the 
model), yet I have shown in a number of publications (LaPolla 1993, to 
appear; LaPolla and Poa, to appear; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997, Ch. 6) 
that not all languages exhibit syntactic relations, and even if they do exhibit 
some constraints on referent role identification, they are not necessarily of 
the  type  associated  with  English  “subject”.  As  mentioned  above, 
lexicogrammatical structure becomes part of the language through repeated 
use to constrain the assembly of the context of interpretation in a particular 
way, so ontogenetically we start with no structure, including no syntactic 
relations.  There  are  synchronically  some  languages,  such  as  Riau 
Indonesian (Gil 1994) and Mandarin Chinese (LaPolla 1993), which have 
not  conventionalized  constraints  on  referent  identification  of  the  type 
associated with syntactic relations (though they may have conventionalized 
other types of constraints on interpretation). What this means is that there 
are no conventionalized associations which relate position in word order, 
the marking on the nouns or verb, and so on with particular semantic roles, 
and so the structures of the language do not force particular interpretations 
of  the  role  of  referents  mentioned  in  discourse.  The  addressee  can  still 
assemble a context of interpretation in which the ostensive act will achieve 
relevance, but the addressee’s inferential process is relatively unconstrained 
compared  to  a  language  that  forces  a  particular  interpretation  of  this 
functional  domain,  and  so  the  addressee  will  have  to  rely  more  on  the 
assumptions of “real-world semantics” to achieve relevance.
6 This does not 
mean  that  there  are  no  conversational  implicatures  that  influence  the 
interpretation. For example, as there is a rather strong frequency correlation 
                                                 
6 An interesting side issue is the relative degree of effort required by speaker vs. 
addressee  in  using  different  languages.  With  a  language  which  has 
conventionalized a large number of obligatory constraints on the interpretation of a 
particular  functional  domain,  the  speaker  will  have  to  expend  more  effort  to 
produce a “grammatical” ostensive  act, while the  addressee will have an easier 
time of finding the relevant interpretation. With a language that does not constrain 
that  particular  domain,  the  speaker  may  have  an  easier  time  producing  a 
“grammatical”  utterance,  but  the  addressee  will  have  to  work  harder  at  the 
inferential  process  (the  same  as  for  the  different  degrees  of  effort  required  by 
speaker vs. addressee for the different answers in (1) within a single language). I 
have treated this issue in a separate paper (LaPolla 2005). Randy J. LaPolla  8 
between topic and actor in Chinese (and many other languages), there is a 
conversational implicature that the topic (the  referent referred to by the 
utterance-initial  referring  expression)  is  the  actor.  It  is  simply  a 
conversational implicature because it can be cancelled by the semantics of 
the referents or the requirements of the context of interpretation, such as in 
Xuéshēng  fā-le  chéngjī  [student(s)  distribute-ASP  grades],  which  would 
more often be understood as ‘The student(s) were given their grades’ rather 
than ‘The students gave out grades (to someone else)’, as students normally 
receive grades, not give them out. What happens in the conventionalization 
of  syntactic  relations  is  that  a  conversational  implicature  of  this  type 
appears so often in discourse that it becomes a conventional implicature, 
and then becomes so strongly conventionalized that speakers cannot accept 
any other interpretation.
7  
  In Chinese this has not (yet) happened, but we can see the same process 
in  the  grammaticalization  of  the  progressive  aspect  marker  out  of  the 
locative verb zài (Chao 1968:333). Initially there was no constraint on the 
interpretation of an on-going action, though when a locative expression was 
used  in  a  serial  verb  construction  with  an  action  verb  there  was  a 
conversational implicature that the action was going on at that location. 
Over  time  this  locative  expression  weakened,  to  just  locative  verb  plus 
unstressed  demonstrative  pronoun,  as  the  implicature  strengthened,  until 
finally the locative verb alone came to force an interpretation of on-going 
action.  
  The  differences  among  conversational  implicature,  conventional 
implicature, and obligatory marking forcing a particular interpretation is the 
degree to which speakers are free to use or not use the particular form to 
constrain the hearer’s inferential process, and also the degree to which the 
form forces a particular interpretation. Old English did not constrain the 
identification  of  the  role  of  a  referent  with  word  order,  though  it  did 
constrain the interpretation of referent role using a complex system of case. 
Even so, the frequency with which reference to actors preceded the verb in 
topic  position  led  to  a  conversational  implicature  that  gradually 
                                                 
7 Even as a conversational implicature the default interpretation can be very strong. 
For example, the implicature that actions occur in the order that they are talked 
about is quite strong in English, and so the average speaker would say that they got 
married and had a baby means something different from they had a baby and got 
married, but the implicature can be cancelled, e.g. by adding but not in that order 
after either of the two possible orders. The How and Why of Syntactic Relations 
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strengthened as the case marking system weakened, until we ended up with 
the current system of Modern English, where word order alone constrains 
the interpretation of the role of the main referents, and what was originally 
the  primary  means  of  constraining  the  interpretation  of  the  role  of  the 
referent (the case marking) is now non-existent or, in the case of pronouns, 
is now secondary, often assigned by word order. 
Conventionalized constraints on the interpretation of coreference across 
clauses  also  develop  in  a  similar  way.  Initially  there  is  no  syntactic 
constraint on cross-clause coreference, and so the interpretation of  what 
noun phrases corefer is completely dependent on inference from real word 
semantics (what makes sense given common knowledge about the world). 
For example, in the following  example from Rawang, a  Tibeto-Burman 
language of northern Burma, any of the three coreference patterns given in 
the three translations would be possible, and which would be correct would 
depend  on  the  addressee’s  inference  of  which  is  most  likely  the 
interpretation intended by the speaker given the addressee’s assumptions 
about hitting and crying and what is known about the people involved.
8 
 
(2)   əpʰūŋí ədɯÏsəÃŋ ədip bɯÏ‡ nɯÃ ŋɯÏa:ʔmì 
  əpʰūŋ-í  ədɯÏ-səÃŋ  ədip  bɯÏ-à  nɯÃ  ŋɯÏ-ap-ì 
  Apung-AGT  Adeu-LOC  hit  PFV-TR.PST  PS  cry-TMdys-INTR.PST 
(i)  ‘Apung hit Adeu and (Apung) cried’ or  
(ii)  ‘Apung hit Adeu and (Adeu) cried’, or  
(iii)  ‘Apung hit Adeu and (someone else) cried’ 
 
Utterances of this type are somewhat rare, though; more often only one 
possible actor is mentioned, as in an utterance like John finished eating and 
left, and so the conversational implicature that the actor is the same in both 
clauses (and it is only an implicature at first) can become strengthened to 
the  point  that  it  becomes  conventionalized  as  the  only  possible 
interpretation, as in English, where a clause such as John put the rock next 
to the chameleon and turned brown has to mean that John turned brown, 
                                                 
8  Abbreviations  used:  AGT  agentive  marker,  INTR.PAST  intransitive  past  tense 
marker, LOC locative marker, PFV perfective aspect marker, PS predicate sequence 
marker (marks non-final clause), TMdys time marker (marks a past action as having 
occurred within the past few days),  TR.PAST transitive past tense marker. In the 
Angami examples in (3), the tones are marked as follows: ā mid-level tone, â low 
falling tone. Randy J. LaPolla  10 
even  if  it  makes  no  sense,  unlike  in  a  language  where  this  coreference 
pattern  has  not  conventionalized  (e.g.  Chinese,  Italian)  and  so  it  would 
more likely be interpreted as meaning the chameleon turned brown. 
Agreement or cross-referencing on the verb develops as an unstressed 
pronoun  is  reinforced  by  a  stressed  pronoun  or  full  noun  phrase  often 
enough for the unstressed pronoun to become cliticized to the verb. We 
clearly  see  this  process  in  Angami  Naga,  a  Tibeto-Burman  language  of 
Northeast India (Giridhar 1980: 32, 59): the verbal prefixes (1sg ā-, 2sg n̂-, 
3sg puô-) are transparently derived from the free pronouns (1sg ā, 2sg nō, 
3sg puô), and can be used together with the free pronouns, as in (3a), or 
with a noun phrase, as in (3b) (see LaPolla 1992a, 1994 for other examples 
from Tibeto-Burman languages).  
 
(3)  a.  nō  n̂-dōvī    b.  nhîcûnyô puô-dōvī   
    2sg  2sg-clever      boy  3sg-clever 
    ‘You are clever.’      ‘(The) boy is clever.’ 
 
Relational marking on noun phrases generally arises through marking of 
location (including ablative and allative), when a locational noun is used to 
constrain the inference of the relationship of some referent to the state of 
affairs being predicated to a locational sense, and then gets extended to the 
marking  of  other  sorts  of  participants  (e.g.  agents)  through  predictable 
pathways (see below for more discussion).  
 
 
4. Why syntactic relations develop 
 
We have seen that syntactic relations develop from a form that is repeated 
over  and  over  again  in  discourse  to  the  point  that  it  becomes 
conventionalized  as  an  obligatory  part  of  the  language,  and  thereby 
obligatorily forces a particular interpretation where otherwise there would 
be two or more possible interpretations. But why would speakers repeat a 
form so often that this would happen?  
The answer lies in the culture of the speakers of the language, their way 
of thinking, their value system. For a form to be used often enough for it to 
become  conventionalized,  it  must  constrain  the  interpretation  of  the 
addressee in a way that is important to the speaker, so important that the 
speaker  is  willing  to  put  extra  effort  into  constraining  the  addressee’s The How and Why of Syntactic Relations 
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inferential  process  in  that  particular  way  to  make  it  more  likely  the 
addressee will “get it right”. That is, the speaker wants to make sure the 
addressee  will  infer  that  part  of  the  communicative  intention  correctly, 
more so, possibly, than other parts of the intention, and so uses a particular 
form that he or she has used successfully before (and other people have 
used successfully before) to constrain the interpretation in the same way as 
he or she has done before, over and over again. (We are creatures of habit 
and  imitation,  and  although  we  sometimes  innovate,  we  more  often  go 
along with our usual habits and also will imitate others.)  
In the case of syntactic relations, what must be important to the speakers 
is that the addressee correctly infer the roles of the major participants. The 
clearest example of this is the development of relation morphology on the 
noun phrase of the type agentive, patient, and/or anti-agentive.
9 Marking of 
participant role is, at least initially, marking of semantic role. In many of 
the languages I’ve looked at (the Tibeto-Burman languages; LaPolla 2004), 
there is a clear development of agentive marking through the extension of 
ablative  or  instrumental  marking  to  constrain  the  inference  of  which 
participant is the agent. This begins only in contexts where there could be 
confusion, such as when there are two human referents mentioned in an 
utterance, and it is optional at that stage. The first speaker to do this would 
have had the desire to constrain the interpretation of the semantic roles, and 
in order to do so used a form already in the language (e.g. ablative marking; 
it is easier to use material already in the language than to create totally new 
material). Over time this marking can become obligatory and can also be 
extended to other sorts of agentive referents. The motivation for patient or 
anti-agentive marking is the same, but in the case of these  markers the 
speakers chose to constrain the interpretation of the role of a non-agent 
rather than an agent. In some of the older systems this type of marking can 
go beyond simple semantic marking, as speakers use material already in the 
language  (the  semantic  marking)  to  constrain  the  interpretation  in  new 
ways. 
In  some  cases  the  pattern  that  gets  conventionalized  might  not 
specifically  involve  extra  effort  on  the  part  of  the  speaker,  but  simply 
refects the discourse habits of the speakers (which again will reflect the 
culture of the speakers). For example, in a culture where actors are very 
                                                 
9 Anti-agentive marking differs from patient marking in that it is not marking what 
role a particular referent has, but what role it does not have: it marks the mention 
of a human referent (at least human patients and datives, but sometimes possessors 
as well) as not being agents. See LaPolla (1992b, 2004). Randy J. LaPolla  12 
often made the topic of conversation, and topics are mentioned in clause-
initial position (also a choice that influences the construction of the context 
of  interpretation),  we  might  see  this  over  time  result  in  the 
conventionalization of a word order constraint such as that in English. We 
can see this tendency developing in some Tibeto-Burman languages, such 
as  Qiang  (LaPolla  with  Huang  2003),  but  it  has  not  yet  fully 
conventionalized.  For  example,  in  a  Qiang  transitive  clause  with  two 
unmarked noun phrases referring to human referents, usually the first one 
will be understood as referring to the agent, but pragmatics still controls 
word order more than semantics, and so if some other referent is more 
topical than the agent, the noun phrase referring to the agent will not appear 
first, and it is in this kind of situation that agentive marking is often used to 
constrain the addressee’s interpretation of the relative roles. Agent-first is 
then  the  default  and  unmarked  situation,  and  could  develop  into  an 
obligatory  interpretation  with  more  reinforcement  through  repeated 
occurrence. 
The  motivation  for  the  development  of  constraints  on  a  particular 
functional domain may not originally be part of the native culture, but can 
come  though  language  contact:  when  people  are  bilingual  in  another 
language that obligatorily constrains the interpretation of some functional 
domain,  e.g.  the  marking  of  source  of  information,  and  they  use  that 
language often enough for the habit of constraining the evidential sense to 
become established, they may eventually feel the necessity to constrain the 
interpretation of source of information when using their own language, and 
so  use  native  material  to  do  just  that,  and  it  may  then  develop  into  an 
obligatory  category  in  their  own  language.  This  is  still  repeated  action 
based  on  the  desire  to  constrain  the  interpretation  in  a  particular  way 
leading to conventionalization, but in this case the motivation came into the 
culture of the speakers through influence of another culture. Relevant to 
syntactic relations, the development of person marking on the verb in some 
Tibeto-Burman  languages  seems  to  be  related  to  language  contact  (see 
LaPolla 2001). 
Although all conventionalization has its origin in repeated actions that 
have  a  cultural  motivation,  it  isn’t  always  possible to  find  a  direct  link 
between some motivation and the linguistic form post facto, especially if 
the conventionalization happened in the far-distant past (though see Enfield 
2002).  This  is  because  we  continue  to  use  forms  that  are  no  longer 
transparently  motivated  just  because  they  are  there,  and  are  part  of  our 
habits of language use. We can see this in the layering of marking, for 
example the fossilization and maintenance of the –r plural in children, even The How and Why of Syntactic Relations 
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though it is not seen as a plural marker by most modern English speakers. 
The  motivations  for  many  words  used  in  English  today  are  opaque  to 
modern English speakers, such as why we say dial to make a phone call, 
but they use the forms anyway. In some cases sound changes can make 
what was once transparently motivated opaque. For example, the modern 
word for ‘crow’ in Mandarin Chinese is wū, which is not transparent, but 
when we look at the way it would have been pronounced when it was first 
used (reconstructed as *ʔa), we can see it was at that time motivated as 
onomatopoeia.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have seen that communication involves ostension and inference, and 
language  develops  as  a  by-product  of  speakers’  repeated  attempts  to 
constrain  the  addressees’ i nference  of  the  speakers’  communicative 
intention in the same way. Syntactic relations in particular develop where 
speakers feel the need to constrain the interpretation of the roles of the 
participants in a state of affairs being talked about. They use certain forms 
to do this over and over again, and so the forms may develop over time into 
obligatory constraints on interpretation, obligatorily constraining the range 
of interpretations for that structure, where there had been alternate possible 
interpretations previously. 
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